The Dim-Post

September 1, 2010

Kiwi Mum and Dad investors

Filed under: economics,finance,Politics — danylmc @ 10:50 am

Via The Herald:

A private equity fund associated with rich-lister businessman George Kerr is to receive a $100 million taxpayer-funded payout from the Government in order to make the receivership of South Canterbury Finance run more smoothly.

Kerr’s Torchlight Fund No1 LP is the largest of a number of prior ranking debtors who are in line to be paid first from the realisation of South Canterbury’s assets . . . the Crown’s $1.6 billion payout to 35,000 depositors will include a $350 million payment to NZX-listed bondholders.

Is there anything stopping hardworking Kiwi mums and dads like George Kerr from taking their money, investing it in one of the seven finance companies still guaranteed by the RDGS at high interest for high risk and then making another taxpayer funded windfall profit if that finance company goes under?

There’s a bit about this in the Herald today: Brian Fallow explains the reasoning behind the government’s actions:

With the economy in general, and rural property market in particular, in their present delicate state, a fire sale is in nobody’s interests.

A receivership with the Crown as the sole creditor also avoids the pressure to call in existing good loans and force borrowers who are meeting their commitments to refinance . . .  And the payout of $1.6 billion to depositors over the next month or so constitutes an unintended additional fiscal stimulus.

So what do we get for our $600 million (plus)? We have already got it.

It is the benefit to the economy as a whole of setting up the deposit guarantee scheme in the darkest days of the global financial crisis two years ago.

I doubt any of this will appease the public’s fury. This will hurt the government’s popularity and hang around its neck right through to the election: every single fiscal decision they make will have the ‘you can afford a $1.7 billion bailout for a finance company but you can’t afford to pay for (x)’ line thrown in their face.

For what it’s worth, I think they did the right thing given the circumstances even though they knew it would be unpopular – which is almost the definition of good government. The important questions now are how the circumstances came to be.  As is almost always the case when a horrible economic catastrophe wipes out massive amounts of wealth in New Zealand, Treasury is deeply implicated. Liam Dann writes:

A lot was already wrong with South Canterbury when it had its public guarantee extended.

For a start it was effectively in breach of its trust deed and had failed to file audited accounts. Having a look at the numbers is usually considered important when assessing a business decision.

The Treasury – which officially makes the call on who gets in to the scheme – could have waited months before accepting the finance company.

But it didn’t. It rushed South Canterbury in to safety because the Government knew it was a goner without the guarantee – although in the end it was a goner anyway.

When those accounts finally arrived a few days later, the auditors highlighted serious concerns about the company’s viability.

Six weeks later, ratings agency S&P downgraded South Canterbury Finance to a level that would have made it ineligible for the scheme.

Treasury were probably too busy urging the government to privatise Kiwibank to bother doing any due diligence on the liability to the taxpayer.

41 Comments »

  1. you can afford a $1.7 billion bailout for a finance company but you can’t afford to pay for (x)

    That would be true, except the Government haven’t actually “bailed out” anything.

    Comment by Phil — September 1, 2010 @ 11:14 am

  2. You really think that’s going to stop the entire country referring to it as ‘the bail out’?

    Comment by danylmc — September 1, 2010 @ 11:15 am

  3. I’ve never used these words in a sentence before, but the Herald’s coverage today is excellent.

    I think for the next crisis we need a plan already in place so everyone can expect what will happen. Key points -

    1) Investors need to know that 8.5% returns over 40 years or so should expect at least a couple of years with big losses – so they stop treating finance co’s like bank deposits and don’t put all their savings there

    2) A future government Guarantee should be legislated for (with details) years in advance so investors know which finance co’s are safe

    3) The Guarantee probably shouldn’t be 100% for all institutions. E.g. if SCF depositors had been paid out at 65 cents in the dollar the taxpayer would have broken even

    4) The Reserve Bank and Treasury either need to assess the co’s more carefully themselves, or if they continue to use the ratings agencies to factor in the fact that the ratings models are wrong in a crisis situation

    The systemic problem here is that the public has the perception that risky business models are / “should be” as safe as bank deposits. This needs to change or it’ll happen all over again.

    Perhaps finance co’s in the future that meet a certain criteria (assessed by the Reserve Bank/Treasury as able to withstand a once-in-100-years crisis) qualify for a whole or partial Guarantee. (Or alternatively use the ratings agencies but tighten the criteria to account for their dismal performance in the last few years).

    It could even be ongoing through the “good times” (with lower fees) so that there’s a pre-funded war-chest ready the next time around.

    That would give a whole lot more certainty to both investors and taxpayers and cut out virtually all the moral hazard. Plus of course finance co’s could choose to operate without it; they could pursue riskier strategies and their investors would be prepared to lose everything.

    Comment by gazzaj — September 1, 2010 @ 11:26 am

  4. Phil’s a details man :-) Good to have a few of them around.

    I think it both looks and smells like a bailout though.

    Comment by gazzaj — September 1, 2010 @ 11:30 am

  5. If the funds had kept SCF out of receivership, then yes. But, it hasn’t.

    Strategic Finance didn’t get a bailout. Mascot Finance didn’t get a bailout, either. Nor did Lombard, St Laurence, Dominion…

    The only difference between those companies and South-Canterbury is that Hubbard doesn’t appear on TV in Armani.

    Comment by Phil — September 1, 2010 @ 11:32 am

  6. Phil: “the only difference…”

    Are there not a few hundred million other differences?

    And have you read cactus on this?

    http://asianinvasion2006.blogspot.com/2010/08/ahubb-over-hotch.html

    she says the govt didn’t have to pay this out under the terms of the contract.

    If she is right, then it is kind of a bailout of the people that are getting paid, to the extent that they are getting back 100cents in the dollar, plus interest, out of this recievership?

    No?

    Comment by Pascal's bookie — September 1, 2010 @ 11:51 am

  7. I’m all about the typo’s and extraneous pieces of punctuation today

    http://asianinvasion2006.blogspot.com/2010/08/ahubb-over-hotch.html

    Comment by Pascal's bookie — September 1, 2010 @ 11:55 am

  8. And have you read cactus on this?

    she says the govt didn’t have to pay this out under the terms of the contract.

    That would have led to a run on all the other finance companies and the destruction of about $10 billion dollars of wealth overnight. Not really an option.

    Comment by danylmc — September 1, 2010 @ 11:56 am

  9. That would have led to a run on all the other finance companies and the destruction of about $10 billion dollars of wealth overnight.

    Probably, but it means the line about ‘our hands were tied, we had a contract, it’s Cullen’s legislation what made us do it’ is bs.

    If they made a decision to bail out these investors for the good of the country when they were not obliged to, then they should be upfront about it.

    Comment by Pascal's bookie — September 1, 2010 @ 12:03 pm

  10. Exactly what I have been trying to get across. Although, it should be noted that it is only blinkered National-party apologists taking that line – John and Bill aren’t…

    Comment by Sam — September 1, 2010 @ 12:07 pm

  11. And the LP are only asking that the decision process over the last year or so be made clear.

    The system: working.

    Comment by Pascal's bookie — September 1, 2010 @ 12:14 pm

  12. For this debate and to respond to Cactus/PB et al, the extension of the guarantee scheme to SCF is irrelevant. The existing guarantee established in 2009 runs until 12 October 2010. Today is 1 September 2010. So the extension is irrelevant. There is an existing legal obligation on the government to pay out. Now in hindsight we may not like having to payout, but buyers remorse is a common experience and i’m sure we will have more cases of it tommorrow, especially for those new shoes with the too tight fitting heel/inner step.

    The counterfactual of Treasury refusing to include SCF into the extended guarantee is likely to have triggered the existing guarantee 9(so same result as today), potentially they were buying time on the basis that there was some interest in recapitalisation of SCF which might have meant avoiding need for receivership. The latter point is called keeping an option open which has some value and no further loss than what would have occurred if prior guarantee is triggered.

    However that option value did not eventuate, therefore Treasury is likely to have advised the government to close out the option position by putting SCF into receivership. Potentially advice on doing so included the view that it is better to trigger the existing guarantee, than what might be the case in 6 months time under the extended guarantee.

    Danyl is right that this will be seen as a bailout by the public regardless of the rights or wrongs, in part because:
    A) Everyone likes to bash the Treasury (they are afterall faceless civil servants who can’t defend themselves so its a free hit)
    B) We have buyers remorse and don’t like accepting consequences of our own (collective/societal)decisions.
    C) Society has never liked money lenders viewing them as having no true value – whether this is right or wrong is irrelevant, it is simply how a large part of the populace feels, mostly because a big part of society either has had to borrow money at some time. Simply put people don’t like paying someone else, hence the natural resentment for money lenders.

    Comment by WH — September 1, 2010 @ 12:56 pm

  13. That is an interesting point WH, which I was not aware of. But it doesn’t address the charge by commentators, including cactus Kate, that the institution did not qualify under either scheme because of lack of prudence…

    That the government did extend the scheme still makes the ‘rat’ argument a difficult one to swallow more generally, even if irrelevant in this particular case…

    Comment by Sam — September 1, 2010 @ 1:12 pm

  14. The hand grenade in SCF is this:

    “…South Canterbury Finance ramped up its risky real estate loans after it signed up to the Government’s scheme that protected its investors’ money, the company’s chief executive Sandy Maier said last night…”

    It is hard to imagine anything more likely to infuriate voters.

    Comment by Sanctuary — September 1, 2010 @ 1:17 pm

  15. Oh – and the ‘floodgate’ effect of the Treasury’s SCF-induced policy (repaying previously ineligible depositors), which will be the next shocker dumped upon us tax-payers, will provide further talking points over the next week or so. Let the wailing and gnashing of teeth begin…

    see here fore details: http://www.interest.co.nz/news/despite-fees-collected-scfs-failure-and-treasurys-new-policy-throws-crown-guarantee-deep-losses

    Comment by Sam — September 1, 2010 @ 1:18 pm

  16. a link from Russell Brown at PA explains the extension as being linked to when the Australians end their scheme. Which makes sense.

    Cullen did anticipate the sort of jeopardy we’re now seeing but thought the price had to be paid.

    Comment by NeilM — September 1, 2010 @ 1:20 pm

  17. we’re becoming the land of many unintended consequences:

    http://www.interest.co.nz/news/first-national-wonders-if-scf-investors-will-deploy-their-nz16-billion-windfall-property-rather-bank

    perhaps opening up Kiwibank to that cash wouldn’t be such a bad idea.

    Comment by NeilM — September 1, 2010 @ 1:28 pm

  18. Heh. John Armstrong calls it all ‘textbook crisis management’. I guess the Finance Ministers press secretaries returned his calls real quick.
    http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10670282

    Comment by danylmc — September 1, 2010 @ 1:31 pm

  19. Sam the initial annoucement of the Guarantee scheme is worth reading (http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/deposit+guarantee+scheme+introduced) when it was initially announced the details of how it would work were possibly not fleshed out. It was done quickly as a reaction to Australia annoucing a guarantee scheme and there was real risk at that time that funds from NZ would rapidly leave NZ to OZ generating a bank run (system wide risk/failure as opposed to an inidivual bank/company collapse which can be contained). (edit – I see in typing this that NeilM also makes the link to OZ) Because the initial annoucement said “The scheme will cover all retail deposits of participating New Zealand-registered banks and retail deposits by locals in non-bank deposit-taking entities. This would include building societies, credit unions and deposit-taking finance companies,” without placing a restriction such as only BB+ rated companies the government was under an obligation to include institutions that smelled. the RBNZ/Tsy very quickly worked to build caveats around this to contain the risk to the Crown/government but by this time SCF was already in.

    This is not to criticise Dr Cullen or even the current government, things moved very very quickly inside 48 hours and the decision was probably correct to avoid the real risk of a bank run.

    On the good news side of things, the financial sector is slowly shaking out. SBS has moved from being a building society to a bank and I note they have just merged with HBS. Both have good ratings and good future prospects, if a couple of other mutual societies join then we may have a very viable/strong co-operative owned national bank. This is a positive for the NZ financial system offering alternatives to the current banks/financiers. Also TSB is doing well and that is another positive. New regulation for Non-bank deposit takers will encourage greater consolidation of the financial sector (meaning stronger larger instiutions but potentially less competition). In the medium term thsi will be good providing a stable financial system. The long run question will be how to ensure tha there is some healthy competition for the benefit of consumers (not investors).

    Sanctuary – I agree that infuriates me and hopefully there is some way sanctions can be applied to the senior management and board of SCF for their actions and possibly the auditors and trustees. However there was not much the government/tsy/rbnz could do due to the initial statement.

    Comment by WH — September 1, 2010 @ 1:37 pm

  20. [refusing SCF payout] …would have led to a run on all the other finance companies and the destruction of about $10 billion dollars of wealth overnight.

    No, it wouldn’t. Finance company debentures are locked in, they’re nothing like a breakable TD with a bank. You can’t (except for extreeeeeeemly rare circumstances) get at your money early.

    It would have put pressure on currently operational finance companies to find alternative funding sources as the DGS rolled off, but when the only substantial companies left are Marac and PGG-Wrightson – who are looking to become ‘heartland bank’, and have those funding lines in development right now – it’s hard to see any overnight destruction.

    By the way, total deposit-taking finance company lending (including those already in Recievership) is $7.22b. There’s maybe $5b of that in rec’ship now. http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/monfin/nblissr/index.html

    the govt didn’t have to pay this out under the terms of the contract

    Cactus has a lot there in one long brain-dump, so I might have missed the kicker, but I think she’s wrong.

    The sole assessor of what is “proper, businesslike, efficient or prudent” lending is the Trustee – in the case of South Canterbury that’s Trustees Executors Limited.

    If TEL felt the SCF was really acting in a way that put the depositors at serious risk, they should have been the first ones to blow the whistle.

    Comment by Phil — September 1, 2010 @ 1:42 pm

  21. What infuriates me is that my struggling household has just made a $1500 investment in, among other things, unsustainable (financially and ecologically) and dodgy agricultural practices that I abhor – without an 8% return in sight…

    Comment by Sam — September 1, 2010 @ 1:46 pm

  22. Brian Fallow: “With… rural property market… in their present delicate state, a fire sale is in nobody’s interests.”

    Hmmm, With the sharp pain a lancing entails, it’s in everybody’s interest to just let the boil throb on.
    There is a case for putting all property onto the market where the loans are not being serviced*. Otherwise, the knowledge of an over-hang simply, err, hangs over the market.

    *Except the loans are secured by second mortgage in the main, and, whilst the loan secured by first mortgage continues to be serviced, there is little the 2nd-mortgageholder can do. Or so I believe, can anyone confirm?

    Comment by Clunking Fist — September 1, 2010 @ 1:56 pm

  23. Good comment by WH @12.56. Also given the labyrinthine way Hubbard operated – there is a mess of related party stuff there and assets were shifted around – I very much doubt Cactus Kate is correct.

    These entities are also in receivership:

    - Belfast Park Limited
    - Tyrone Estates Limited
    - Braebrook Properties Limited
    - FACE Finance Limited
    - Fairfield Finance Limited
    - Flexi Lease Limited
    - Rental Cars Limited
    - Galway Park Limited
    - Helicopter Nominees Limited
    - Hornchurch Limited
    - SCFG Systems Limited
    - Sophia Investments Limited
    - Southbury Insurance Limited

    Let’s wait and see what the SFO guy has to say, eh.

    Comment by Ruth — September 1, 2010 @ 2:13 pm

  24. Hang on a second, People.

    The vast majority of loans that have got SCF into trouble aren’t the agri lending – it’s the Mezzanine (2nd tier) finance they’ve been doing on Auckland and Wellington property development.

    Comment by Phil — September 1, 2010 @ 2:26 pm

  25. You are probably correct, Phil, up to a point. But _zero_ interest loans to local dairying are not exactly good “investments” for a _finance_ company. Those should really be lumped in with the charities, I would think.

    Comment by David in Chch — September 1, 2010 @ 2:53 pm

  26. Phil – again your correct (the external/tradeable sector is not in trouble). The loans to farming sector is not the place to worry about. The yet again near record fonterra payout means nearly all farms have sufficient cash flows to meet debt. Farms that were in trouble would already have been flushed out when the dairy payout collapse – see Crafer farms as the classic example.

    What is happening in the economy now is the second round impacts of a slow domestic market meaning that non-tradeables (housing/property development) has not had the cashflow recovery needed to either on sell property or generate enough revenue to pay down high debt.

    So the squarking that this is a bailout for the South Island is incorrect (something cactus is trying to perpetuate) – this actually is a bailout to the North Island retirees that chased high deposit rates and property developers – now which demographic segment of the economy fueled the property prices can only go up mania?

    Comment by WH — September 1, 2010 @ 2:56 pm

  27. “Except the loans are secured by second mortgage in the main, and, whilst the loan secured by first mortgage continues to be serviced, there is little the 2nd-mortgageholder can do. Or so I believe, can anyone confirm?”

    If the second mortgage is in arrears, the mortgagor (in this case SCF) can issue PLA notice and commence recovery proceedings, even if the first mortgage is up to date. But SCF second mortgage loans would have been at a high LVR, so with property values plummeting, any fire sale would leave SCF swinging in the breeze.

    So now the taxpayer is the one swinging in the breeze on all the SCF 2nd mtge loans in arrears. Each will have dealt with on a case by case basis. Sometimes the threat of bankruptcy will see some family money come out of the woodwork on the rural side. But the loans to developers are likely to be terminal.

    Comment by Pat — September 1, 2010 @ 2:57 pm

  28. The irony is that Timaru, far from becoming a ghost town, will be awash with cash in a months time.

    Comment by Pat — September 1, 2010 @ 3:00 pm

  29. Excellent comments WH. Thanks. I think the error was including finance companies, as they were always vulnerable to related party loans with weak guarantees. Now, seeing as South Cantebury has got $1.6 billion of taxpayer money, I want to know:

    (1) Who are the depositors and bondholders getting paid out?
    (2) Who are the beneficiaries of the dodgy loans?

    This information should be published in full page ads in the dailys, and put online for crowd sourced investigation and analysis.

    Comment by Vibenna — September 1, 2010 @ 3:01 pm

  30. “The irony is that Timaru, far from becoming a ghost town, will be awash with cash in a months time.”

    Not sure about this – what proportion of the $1.7 billion came from Timaru and environs? There’s only 43,000 people in the town, so I suspect the earlier comment about this bailout really being about saving the bacon of North Island retirees (and private equity funds) is closer to the mark.

    I get the impression that it is Hubbard’s other vehicles (Aorangi Securities, et al) that got their money from local sources on a personal basis – and these aren’t covered by the guarantee so investors stand to lose a lot.

    Comment by Andrew Geddis — September 1, 2010 @ 3:26 pm

  31. WH

    “For this debate and to respond to Cactus/PB et al, the extension of the guarantee scheme to SCF is irrelevant. ……….There is an existing legal obligation on the government to pay out”.

    My point was that the guarantees were AMENDED not extended as the existing guarantee I stated was for two years which is still running. And SCF by the admission of its own CEO on Campbell Live las night was in breach of the original guarantee, let alone the amended guarantees (3 after the original SCF one)that clearly defined the obligations of SCF as a prudent business operation.

    So lets forget that this payment was made by National in relation to the guarantee, it was not. It was straight interim corporate welfare while a new buyer is found. There was a very strong case that there is no legal obligation at all to pay out because SCF breached the terms of the guarantee.

    $1 billion according to Key and English is “good” debt ie. saleable and $700m is poked debt. As they have by now being briefed we can take these numbers as given.

    I would imagine very shortly the vultures will work and clen that all up nicely, leaving someone with a great deal on that $1billion and all of you with the pieces to pay for on the 700m.

    Welcome to interventionalism.

    Comment by Cactus Kate — September 1, 2010 @ 3:28 pm

  32. You want to know who the depositors and bond holders getting paid out are and who are the beneficiaries of the dodgy loans . . .
    COME ON – do you honestly believe they will let you see into the intricate web
    of deceit going on here
    perhaps we should ask Glenn Beck

    Comment by Stew — September 1, 2010 @ 3:31 pm

  33. Cactus – I’m not trying to pck a fight with you, I generally respect your work, but in this instance the guarantee is not to the institution per se but to the depositors of the institution. So whilst you could argue SCF breached the guarantee, that is a problem for Tsy/RBNZ and the management of SCF. But for depositors the guarantee still holds. Their is a strong argument under equity that regardless of the actions of management, the obligation for the Crown is to payout to depositors who invested on the basis that SCF held a guarantee.

    This takes us back to the counterfactual I used earlier, if SCF management breached guarantee requirements, the govt could have removed the guarantee for SCF going forward, but all depositors in SCF would have had a very strong case that the Crown was legally obliged to pay them out. It should be noted that due to the guarantee the govt had effectively nationalised the financial system with institutions that hold a guarantee effectively being agents of the government – so a principal-agent relationship was in place and therefore ignoring the prior equity argument there is further grounds for an obligation by the Crown to payout depositors.

    Your scenario works if this was a bailout and the government was making an equity injection into SCF.

    By the way your general commentary about farm productivity and asset value is correct – currently we are dodging this problem. I’d like to say that the dairy farming bubble will burst, but suspect the short run problem is the likely collapse of sheep farming (due to loss of economy of scale in processing sector as more sheep farms convert to dairy or dairy run off).

    Comment by WH — September 1, 2010 @ 4:01 pm

  34. “It should be noted that due to the guarantee the govt had effectively nationalised the financial system with institutions that hold a guarantee effectively being agents of the government”
    Well, as Americans who aren’t bankers have recently discovered: the RISKS have been nationalised via deposit guarantees, but not the rewards.

    Comment by Clunking Fist — September 1, 2010 @ 6:22 pm

  35. Excellent level of detail and fact in here. Nice one…

    Comment by garethw — September 1, 2010 @ 7:26 pm

  36. That is fine. We can nationalise the financial system once we have sold Kiwibank.

    While I enjoy Cactus Kate’s entries I never realised she was the saviour of the
    world’s economies.

    Cactus is NEVER wrong. Yeah right.

    Comment by peterlepaysan — September 1, 2010 @ 8:19 pm

  37. Since it seems we can’t weasel out of our obligations to SCF depositors, here is my plan to avoid moral hazard:
    1. End deposit guarantees for finance companies now
    2. Next time a finance company goes splat, send everyone not connected to that company a crisp new Rutherford. Stimulus!

    Comment by bradluen — September 1, 2010 @ 8:38 pm

  38. MH

    My reading of it is that the DoG’s (the ones that I attached to my post) are executed between two parties, the Crown and the Principal Debtor (SCF). Treasury has withdrawn 2 guarantees:

    “He said guarantees had been withdrawn from two companies previously – from Viaduct Capital when its actions meant people were covered by the scheme who it was not intended for and another company which paid back all depositors”.

    http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10670415

    The issue now seems from their own commentary that SCF should never have qualified to go into the scheme in the first place and once in the scheme they were bound by the DoG’s to behave in a fashion they did not (prudent and businesslike). That is SCF’s fault and that of its officers.

    In Treasury now stating specifically that SCF did not breach the DoG’s the conclusion can only be drawn that Treasury knew all along about the activities of SCF (including the higher risk profile taken on) and backed it anyway. In many ways this now becomes more disturbing.

    From many round-ups I have read today commentators cannot take a great leap over the fact the CEO has stated publicly that once it was tied up in a guarantee, SCF behaved in a fashion that it otherwise would not have and took on a higher risk profile.

    In any instance it will be most interesting to hear from Mr Hubbard when he finally puts out a public statement or agrees to be interviewed.

    Comment by Cactus Kate — September 1, 2010 @ 9:15 pm

  39. peterlepaysan

    Such a glib comment to which I can only state that while most people on this thread are contributing to a positive debate, you Sir are not.

    No one gets it right 100% of the time but I can guaran-damn-tee I am right a hell of a lot more times than you.

    Comment by Cactus Kate — September 1, 2010 @ 9:24 pm

  40. Cactus
    That was such a well informed, educated and logical response I am gobsmacked.
    I bow to your superior intellect and knowledge.

    Comment by peterlepaysan — September 1, 2010 @ 10:29 pm

  41. The problem the Guarantee was supposed to address – the potential for investors to lose confidence in good loans/businesses and cause them to collapse (by not reinvesting deposits) – has not been solved by the Guarantee. SCF still collapsed, as did most finance firms, despite the Guarantee.

    Here’s a belated alternative – the government could have given a Guarantee that if any finance company went bust , they would provide interim funding to any investment that finance company had that was deemed to be viable.

    In other words, instead of just letting finance companies stagger on and then go bust, then have to pay taxpayers cash out to debenture holders for SCF’s good AND BAD loans , govt could have put the funds aside to give bridging finance to any loan or business that was dragged down by a finance company being it’s lender. Invest with rapid due diligence in the good loans held by finance companies, not pay out for the bad loans.

    Comment by bob — September 2, 2010 @ 12:01 am


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